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JUSTICE AT THE MARGINS: EQUITABLE TOLLING OF
WASHINGTON'S DEADLINE FOR FILING COLLATERAL
ATTACKS ON CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS
Mark A. Wilner
Abstract: RCW 10.73.090 establishes a one-year deadline for appealing a final criminal
judgment in Washington State. This Comment argues that this one-year deadline should be
subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, which can prevent a statute of limitation from
expiring when extraordinary circumstances preclude timely filing. After examining the text,
legislative history, structure, purpose, and policy implications of RCW 10.73.090, this
Comment demonstrates that the one-year deadline does not operate as a jurisdictional bar,
which would revoke judicial power to hear a postconviction appeal after one year under any
circumstances, but instead acts as a statute of limitation subject to equitable tolling. This
Comment also argues that the filing deadline should be subject to equitable tolling because
the overwhelming majority of federal circuit courts to consider the issue have reached the
similar conclusion that the one-year limitation for filing federal habeas corpus petitions can be
equitably tolled.

"[S]wiftjustice demands more thanjust swiftness., 1
Imagine being wrongfully incarcerated, mentally disabled, unable to
communicate in English, and without the right to counsel. What are your
chances of meeting Washington State's one-year deadline for filing a
postconviction appeal? Imagine being wrongfully incarcerated, diligent
about pursuing your appellate rights, but missing the one-year deadline
due to a careless prison official not following mailing instructions. Will
the court bend the rules? Can it?
These fact patterns may not be commonplace, but they do occur.2 We
all know that our criminal justice system is not perfect-that innocent
persons are sometimes wrongfully incarcerated. While no comprehensive
statistics exist, a "conservative" survey estimates the national wrongful
conviction rate at 0.5%.3 This conservative estimate suggests that

1. Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363,390 (6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Miles v. Prnty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving prison officials
who carelessly failed to mail habeas corpus petition); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 163
F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving mentally incompetent prisoner).
3. Ronald C. Huff et al., Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy 55
(1996) (basing statistic on survey of "very conservative sample," including 41 attorneys general).
The estimate suggests that courts are 99.5% accurate in felony cases. See id. at 61.
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currently more than 10,000 prisoners are wrongfully incarcerated.4
Practitioners estimate that the wrongful conviction rate may be as high as
ten percent,5 necessarily implying 200,000 wrongful convictions. These
figures suggest that Washington prisons house between 73 and 1454
wrongfully convicted inmates. While increasing access to the appellate
system might provide one solution, our lawmakers have done just the
opposite by limiting the time period within which inmates can bring
postconviction appeals
This Comment argues that Washington courts can apply the doctrine
of equitable tolling to Washington's one-year time limit for bringing a
postconviction appeal. Equitable tolling would prevent the one-year time
limit from expiring when extraordinary circumstances prevent a timely
filing.9 Equitable tolling therefore acts as a basic measure of fairness to
increase the likelihood that such circumstances do not block access to the
appellate system. Part I of this Comment describes the criminal appeals
process for defendants convicted in Washington and outlines the
deadline for filing appeals in state and federal court. Part II describes the
doctrine of equitable tolling and the statutory construction analysis courts
use to determine when equitable tolling may be applied. Part II also
outlines the relevant circumstances in which Washington courts follow
federal law, and describes how federal courts have equitably tolled the
federal filing deadline for postconviction appeals. Part III raises two
distinct but mutually supportive arguments to show that Washington's
one-year period for bringing a postconviction appeal should be subject to
equitable tolling. First, the text, legislative history, structure, purpose,

4. See Kay Lazar, Nation's Bogus Convictions May Number in the Thousands, Boston Herald,
May 9, 1999, at 24, availablein 1999 WL 3397863; see also Huff, supra note 3, at 62.
5. See Memorandum from Frederick Leatherman to Innocence Project Northwest (Aug. 1999) (on
file with author) (basing 10% estimate on, inter alia, DNA exclusion rates reported in recent U.S.
Department of Justice report). Mr. Leatherman, a prominent Seattle criminal defense attorney, cofounded Innocence Project Northwest, a nonprofit organization that represents factually innocent,
indigent prisoners in collateral attack proceedings. For the exclusion rates in the report, see Peter
Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, ForwardCommentary to Edward Conners et al., U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
Convicted by Juries,Exoneratedby Science at xxviii-xxix (1996). See also Conners et al. at 20.
6. For the present national prison population, see Jesse Katz, A Nation of Too Many Prisoners?,
L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 2000, available in 2000 WL 2211053 (estimating population at two million).
7. See Washington State Dep't of Corrections, Prison Population (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.wa.gov/doc/Content/pop.html> (reporting that as of January 1, 2000, there were 14,535
inmates in Washington prisons).
8. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (1998).
9. See infra Part II.

Equitable Tolling
and policy of the one-year time bar indicate that equitable tolling would
not contravene legislative intent. Second, the Washington and federal
postconviction filing deadlines are analogous; because Washington law
is virtually silent on whether its statute is subject to equitable tolling,
Washington courts should look to the wealth of federal authority holding
that the federal statute can be equitably tolled. In the face of proposed
legislation further limiting access to criminal appeals,"° this Comment
advocates for judicial discretion to equitably toll otherwise untimely
postconviction petitions for the sake ofjustice at the margins.
I.

THE CRIMINAL APPEALS PROCESS FOR DEFENDANTS
CONVICTED IN WASHINGTON STATE COURTS

The Washington State criminal appeals process can be divided into
two distinct procedures: direct appeals and collateral attacks.
A.

DirectAppeals in Washington State Courts

When defendants in state criminal matters have been tried and
convicted, they have a legal right to appeal the trial court judgment,
seeking relief usually from the court of appeals." This is called a "direct
appeal," as it stems from the original trial proceeding, and convicted
defendants generally may raise only those issues on direct appeal that
were first raised at the trial court. 2 For example, attorneys who fail to
object to the admissibility of certain evidence during trial may not appeal
the admission of that evidence. 3 For convicted defendants electing not to
appeal, criminal judgments become final when filed with the clerk of the
14
trial court.
10. See H.B. 2088, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999) (stating, inter ala, that "[t]he time for
filing a [collateral attack] is jurisdictional") (pending as of April 17, 2000).
11. See Wash. Const art , § 22; see also Wash. R. App. P. 4.1(a). Direct supreme court review is
allowed in certain cases, for example, capital cases. See Wash. R. App. P. 4.2(a).
12. See Wash. R. App. P. 2.5(a); State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 332-33, 899 P.2d 1251,
1255 (1995); see, e.g., State v. Haggerty, No. 41734-7-, 1999 WL 1081277, at *1 n.1 (Wash. Ct.
App. Nov. 29, 1999) (refusing to hear ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal

because matter was not contained in trial record). But see Wash. R. App. P. 2.5(a) (providing that
lack of trial court jurisdiction, failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted, and
manifest error affecting constitutional right can be raised for first time on direct appeal).
13. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 58 Wash. App. 478,485-86,794 P.2d 38,42 (1990).
14. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(3)(a) (1998).
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If convicted defendants do appeal and the court of appeals affirms the
trial court judgment, defendants may petition the Supreme Court of
Washington for discretionary review of the appellate court's decision. 5
Unlike with appeals of trial court judgments, defendants have no legal
right to supreme court review of adverse appellate decisions. 6 If
defendants do not petition for review, or if the supreme court refuses to
consider the appeal, the court of appeals issues a mandate to the trial
court terminating the direct appeal, 7 which makes the trial court
judgment final. 8 If the supreme court grants a petition for review, it
considers only issues raised in the petition. 9 If the supreme court affirms
the appellate court, it issues its own mandate to the trial court finalizing
the criminal judgment.2"
The last possible relief on direct appeal lies with the U.S. Supreme
Court. Like state supreme courts, the U.S. Supreme Court may deny
requests for review.2' Only if the state appellate decision depends on a
federal question, such as the constitutionality of a Washington statute,
may the U.S. Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari, and thus agree to
hear the appeal.22 In most cases, certiorari is denied.' When the Court
denies certiorari, convicted defendants have exhausted all direct appeal
opportunities and the trial court judgment becomes final.24
B.

CollateralAttacks in Washington State Courts

Following direct appeal, when the trial court judgment is deemed
final,2" convicted defendants may attack the judgment collaterally in state
court.26 This attack is "collateral" because it is a process distinct from the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See Wash.
See id.
See Wash.
See Wash.
See Wash.
See Wash.

R. App. P. 13.1(a).
R. App. P. 12.5(b).
Rev. Code § 10.73.090(3)(b) (1998).
R. App. P. 13.7(b).
R. App. P. 12.5(c); see also Wash. Rev. Code

§ 10.73.090(3)(b).

21. See Sup. Ct.R. 10.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(3)(c) (1998).
25. See supranotes 14, 18, 20, 24, and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note 39.
26. See generally Wash. R. App. P. 16.3-. 15 (governing personal restraint petitions in appellate
court); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 7.36.010-.250 (1998) (governing state habeas corpus in superior court);
see also infra note 30 and accompanying text.

Equitable Tolling

original criminal case, allowing prisoners to raise issues not addressed at
trial or on direct appeal.27 Before state prisoners can obtain relief by

collateral attack, all other remedies must be inadequate.2" If the court
believes a prisoner is "unlawfully restrained," it has broad discretion to
grant appropriate relief as justice requires.2 9 In Washington, collateral

attack means "any form of postconviction relief other than a direct
appeal," and includes "a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus
petition, a motion to vacate judgment, a motion to withdraw guilty plea,
a motion for a new trial, and a motion to arrest judgment."3' While each
of these forms of collateral attack has a distinct purpose and is generally
guided by different rules,3 1 all are governed by the same statutory filing
deadline.32

In general, petitions for collateral attack must be filed within one year
from the date the criminal judgment becomes final.33 Prior to 1989, no
time period restricted the filing of collateral attacks in Washington. 4 In
1989, the state legislature instated the one-year deadline35 to promote the
finality of criminal judgments and to help manage the overwhelming
flow of petitions.36 The statute applies to all petitions filed after July 23,

27. See, e.g., State v. Harper, 64 Wash. App. 283, 289 n.3, 823 P.2d 1137, 1141 n.3 (1992)
(finding that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel matter not addressable on direct appeal can be
considered on collateral attack); see also In re Gentry, 137 Wash. 2d 378, 388, 972 P.2d 1250, 1256
(1999) (declining to hear issues on collateral attack that were already decided on direct appeal).
28. See Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(d).
29. Wash. R. App. P. 16.4(c).
30. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(2) (1998).
31. See supra note 26.
32. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (1998).
33. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(1). RCW 10.73.100 lists certain exceptions to the one-year
rule. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
34. See In re Cook, 114 Wash. 2d 802, 805, 792 P.2d 506, 508 (1990).
35. See Criminal Judgments and Sentences-Collateral Attacks-One Year Time Limit, ch. 395,
§ 1, 1989 Wash. Laws 2149, 2149. RCW 10.73.090 was introduced in the 1989 regular session of
the 51st Legislature as H.B. 1071, adopted in amended version as S.H.B. 1071, and passed as Laws
of 1989, ch. 395, § 1.
36. See State v. Lee, No. 40457-1-, 1999 WL 30359, at *4 (Wash. Ct App. Jan. 25, 1999); see
also In re Becker, 96 Wash. App. 902,905,982 P.2d 639, 640 (1999).
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1990,37 and all persons held in custody must be given notice of the
deadlines.3 8
As a result of this 1989 legislation, the statute reads as follows:
Collateral attack-One year time limit
(1) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and
sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after
the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid
on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.39
At the same time the legislature created the one-year time limit, it also
created exceptions to this limit. RCW 10.73.100 provides exceptions
based solely on one or more of the following grounds: (1) Newly
discovered evidence ... ; (2) The statute that the defendant was
convicted of violating was unconstitutional... ; (3) The conviction
was barred by double jeopardy ... ; (4) The defendant pled not
guilty and the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
support the conviction; (5) The sentence imposed was in excess of
the court's jurisdiction; or (6) There has been a significant change
in the law ...'
Washington courts have interpreted RCW 10.73.090 strictly, not
allowing exceptions to the one-year limit other than those included in
RCW 10.73.100. 41 In Shumway v. Payne,4 the Supreme Court of
Washington stated that RCW 10.73.090 created a "mandatory rule that
acts as a bar to ... consideration of [collateral attacks] filed after the
limitation period has passed., 43 This interpretation of the time limit is
supported by legislative history." When discussing the 1989 legislation,
37. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.130 (1998).
38. RCW 10.73.120 requires the Department of Corrections to attempt to advise its inmates of the
one-year time limit. RCW 10.73.110 requires the court at time of sentencing to advise the defendant
of the one-year period.
39. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (1998).
40. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(1)-(6) (1998).
41. See, e.g., Shumway v. Payne, 136 Wash. 2d 383, 397-400, 964 P.2d 349, 355-57 (1998); In
re Well, 133 Wash. 2d 433,443, 946 P.2d 750,754 (1997).
42. 136 Wash. 2d 383, 964 P.2d 349 (1998).
43. Id. at 397-98, 964 P.2d at 356; see also Well, 133 Wash. 2d at 443, 946 P.2d at 754 (stating
that RCW 10.73.090 acts as "procedural bar").
44. See Final Legis. Rep., S.H.B. 1071, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1989) [hereinafter Final
Legis. Rep.]. Remaining legislative history does not contradict a strict interpretation. See H.B. &
S.H.B. 1071, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1989); 1 House Journal, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. 62, 253,

Equitable Tolling
the House Judiciary Committee reiterated that the one-year limit restricts
a defendant's right to file a collateral attack, except when a RCW

10.73.100 exception applies.45
C.

CollateralAttacks by Washington State Prisonersin Federal
Courts

If a collateral attack in a Washington State court proves unsuccessful,
a prisoner may collaterally attack the state trial court judgment in federal
district court by filing a petition for federal habeas corpus. A habeas
corpus proceeding is a civil action against the official who holds the
prisoner to inquire into the legality of confinement.4 7 Federal habeas

corpus relief will be granted only if the incarceration violates the U.S.
Constitution, a treaty, or a law of the United States.4 8 If a federal court
deems the restraint illegal, it may grant appropriate relief as justice
requires.

49

The U.S. Supreme Court has commonly regarded habeas corpus as a
legal remedy governed by equitable principles. 50 The Court
has not... characterized [habeas corpus] "by simple, rigid rules
which, by avoiding some abuses, generate others," nor by
"interpretations... that would suffocate... or hobble [the writ's]
effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural

requirements." Rather, "[t]he very nature of the writ demands that
494-95, 2175-76, 2616, 2622 (Wash. 1989); 1 Senate Journal, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. 492-93, 915,
1232, 1629-30, 2100, 2497-98 (Wash. 1989); Legislative Digest and History of Bills-House, 51st
Leg., Reg. Sess. 39 (Wash. 1989).
45. See Final Legis. Rep., supra note 44.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Prisoners convicted in federal court may also
petition for federal habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). While this
Comment focuses on the time period for Washington prisoners filing collateral attacks, both state
and federal prisoners are bound by a general one-year time limit for filing federal habeas corpus
claims. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
47. See Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994).
50. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986); see also James S. Liebman & Randy
Hertz, FederalHabeas Corpus Practiceand Procedure § 2.2, at 11-13 (3d ed. 1998) ("[R]ecently,
the Court has described habeas corpus as governed less by 'statutory developments' than by 'a
complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical
usage... and judicial decision.'") (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,489 (1991)).
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it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to
ensure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected," and that preclusive doctrines and formalities "yield to
the
imperative
of
correcting ... fundamentally
unjust
incarceration."'"
In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act5 2 (AEDPA), which imposes a general one-year limit on state
prisoners bringing federal habeas corpus claims. 3 Prior to that time, no
statutory time limit applied to filing federal habeas corpus petitions.'
Under AEDPA, the time limit begins to run when direct appeal
concludes and the state court judgment becomes final." The statute does,
however, permit exceptions.5 6 If state action in violation of the
Constitution or federal law prevented a prisoner from filing a petition,
the one-year period begins when the impediment is removed.57 If the
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes and retroactively applies a constitutional
right asserted by the petitioner, the one-year period begins when the right
was initially recognized by the Court. 8 Finally, if newly discovered
evidence supports the petitioner's claim, the one-year period begins
when the evidence could have been discovered through due diligence by
the petitioner. 9
Congress and the Washington legislature thus have created general
one-year time periods within which state prisoners must file collateral
attacks. But what if circumstances prevent prisoners from meeting these
deadlines? Are courts bound to strictly apply these time periods when
doing so produces inequitable results?

51. Liebman & Hertz, supranote 50, § 2.2, at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
52. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (imposing general one-year limit for federal prisoners).
54. See Liebman & Hertz, supra note 50, § 5.1b, at 218 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 637 (1993)).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Equitable Tolling
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
"Limitation[]periods are by their very nature harsh because they
cut off aperson's rights without regardto the merits of [the] claim.
The doctrine of equitable tolling has evolved to temper this harsh
result."6

A.

History and Purposeofthe Doctrine

The doctrine of equitable tolling stops a statute of limitation61 from
expiring when justice requires.62 Discretionary application of equitable
tolling depends on the particular facts of a case and is not governed by
bright-line rules; 3 courts must determine whether a case manifests
appropriate "rare and exceptional circumstances" to justify equitable

tolling.' Courts apply the doctrine when petitioners are prevented from
timely asserting their legal rights due to opposing parties' wrongful
conduct or when extraordinary circumstances outside of petitioners'

control make it impossible to comply with filing deadlines.'

For

example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals equitably tolled the filing
deadline for an otherwise expired federal habeas corpus claim when the
attorney pursuing the petitioner's claim withdrew from the case and left

behind

unusable

work

product

for

replacement

counsel-an

extraordinary "turn of events over which [the petitioner] had no

control."'

6

60. Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the FederalTort ClaimsAct:
The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 885, 886 (1999) (citing Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).
61. For consistency, this Comment uses "statute of limitation" and not "statute of limitations."
Likewise, this Comment uses "limitation period" and not "limitations period."
62. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran, & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1994); see
also Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash. 2d 193, 206, 955 P.2d 791, 797 (1998) ("ITihis court allows
equitable tolling when justice requires."); State v. Duvall, 86 Wash. App. 871, 874, 940 P.2d 671,
674 (1997) ("The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to allow an action to proceed when
justice requires it, even though a statutory time period has nominally elapsed.").
63. See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999).
64. Id. (quoting Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)).
65. See Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1999); Alvarez-Machain v. United
States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996).
66. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Equitable tolling allows a court to hear an action when literal
application of a statute of limitation would be inequitable.6 7 Historically,
courts of equity imposed limitation periods but would not allow parties
to profit from their own bad conduct.6" For example, the House of Lords
held that when a defendant concealed a fraudulent bond transaction from
the plaintiff for nine years, the defendant could not equitably assert the
statute of limitation as a defense.69 Modem courts have invoked their
power to grant equity by tolling in other circumstances.70 In the context
of prisoners filing collateral attacks, courts modify the doctrine of
equitable tolling from its traditional form to cover inequitable
circumstances caused by people or entities-such as lawyers, prison
officials, or courts-that have adversely affected petitioners' ability to
file timely.7' Courts routinely dismiss untimely petitions, rather than
permit equitable tolling, when petitioners fail to act with due diligence to
meet the filing deadline.72 When petitioners prove that they acted with
due diligence,73 however, federal courts considering late habeas petitions
and Washington courts in non-collateral attack contexts have equitably
tolled statutes of limitation in a variety of cases. 74 For example, when a
petitioner collaterally attacked a state court conviction in federal court
67. See Coleman, 184 F.3d at 402; see also Millay, 135 Wash. 2d at 206, 955 P.2d at 797; Duvall,
86 Wash. App. at 874, 940 P.2d at 674.
68. See David D. Doran, Comment, Equitable Tolling ofStatutory Benefit Time Limitations: A
CongressionalIntent Analysis, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 681, 682 (1989).
69. See Booth v. Earl ofWarrington, 2 Eng. Rep. 111, 111-13 (1714).
70. See Note, Statutes of Limitationsand Opting Out of Class Actions, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 405
n.22 (1982).
71. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 66; see also infra note 75.
72. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (permitting no equitable
tolling where failure to file timely was due to attorney's being out of office and claimant filed within
30 days of personally receiving notice). The Court stated:
We have allowed equitable tolling [when] the [petitioner] has actively pursued his judicial
remedies ... or where the [petitioner] has been induced or tricked by his adversary's
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. We have generally been much less
forgiving in receiving late filings where the [petitioner] failed to exercise due diligence in
preserving his legal rights.... [T]he principles of equitable tolling.., do not extend to what is
at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.
Id.; see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Equity is not intended for those
who sleep on their rights."). For Washington decisions, see Hazel v. Van Beek, 135 Wash. 2d 45, 61,
954 P.2d 1301, 1308 (1998), Gunnier v. Yakima Heart Ctr., Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 854, 864-65, 953
P.2d 1162, 1168 (1998), and Duvall, 86 Wash. App. at 876, 940 P.2d at 674.
73. Determining due diligence entails a fact-specific inquiry involving various principles beyond
the scope of this Comment.
74. See infra notes 75 and 77.

Equitable Tolling
alleging mental incompetency, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal
filing deadline should be equitably tolled until a reasonable time after a
court determined competency.75 In State v. Duvall,76 the Washington
court of appeals equitably tolled the period for a court to order restitution
almost 200 days beyond the statutory time limit because the defendant

received notice at sentencing of the later restitution order, showed no
prejudice by the later order, and failed to evidence bad faith or lack of
due diligence by the State.77 However, the Supreme Court of Washington
has never determined whether the one-year time limit for filing collateral

attacks in Washington is subject to equitable tolling. In fact, only eight
Washington cases discuss the doctrine."
75. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998). For other
examples of courts equitably tolling the federal habeas corpus filing deadline, see Miles v. Prunty,
187 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (equitably tolling deadline when prison officials did not comply
with petitioner's instructions to mail petition and petitioner exercised due diligence by submitting
petition to prison authorities within 17 days of deadline), Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that where petition is filed late due to fraud perpetrated on petitioner, statute of
limitation is equitably tolled until date fraud is discovered and that this equitable doctrine is read into
every federal statute of limitation), Fisher,174 F.3d at 715 ("In the right circumstances, a delay in
receiving information might call for equitable tolling-such as if the prison did not obtain copies of
AEDPA for months and months, or if an essential piece of information was delayed near the filing
deadline."), Calderon, 163 F.3d at 541 (equitably tolling deadline when petitioner reasonably relied
on prior court order), Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (implying that lack of
access to legal materials could support equitable tolling if petitioner could specifically show how
access was denied), and Torres v. Miller, No. 99 Civ. 0580 MBM, 1999 WL 714349, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1999) (providing examples based on petitioner's illness); see also supra note 66
and accompanying text.
76. 86 Wash. App. 871, 940 P.2d 671 (1997) (reconsidering 84 Wash. App. 439, 928 P.2d 459
(1996)).
77. See id. at 876, 940 P.2d at 674-75. For other Washington examples, see Millay v. Cam, 135
Wash. 2d 193,206, 955 P.2d 791, 797 (1998) (holding that "the statutory redemption period [for real
property] may be equitably tolled when the redemptioner in possession submits a grossly
exaggerated statement of the sum required to redeem and the prospective redemptioner cannot with
due diligence ascertain the sum required to redeem within the time remaining") and Douchette v.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash. 2d 805, 811-13, 818 P.2d 1362, 1364-66 (1991) (applying
equitable tolling to Washington age-discrimination statute but finding no tolling warranted on lack
of due-diligence grounds, because plaintiff knew of remedy within six months of alleged
discriminatory act but waited three years to file suit and did not make claim that EEOC misled her,
nevertheless, the court stated that "we do not rule out the possibility there may be cases in which the
filing deadline... may be equitably tolled"). See also infra note 229.
78. See Millay, 135 Wash. 2d at 205-08, 955 P.2d at 796-98; Hazel v. Van Beek, 135 Wash. 2d
45, 61-64, 954 P.2d 1301, 1308-10 (1998); Gunnier v. Yakima Heart Ctr., Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 854,
864-66, 953 P.2d 1162, 1168 (1998); Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 810-13, 818 P.2d at 1364-66;
Prekeges v. King County, No. 41974-9-I, 1999 WL 675962, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1999);
Duvall, 86 Wash. App. at 874-76, 940 P.2d at 673-75; Finkelstein v. Security Properties, Inc., 76
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Statutory Construction Determines Whether Equitable Tolling May
Apply to Limitation Periods

Federal and Washington case law requires that before applying the
doctrine of equitable tolling,79 courts must determine that the legislature
intended a time limitation to function as a statute of limitation and not a
jurisdictional bar."0 In enacting jurisdictional bars, the legislature restricts
the length of time during which a court has power to adjudicate cases.8'
If the legislature intends a time limitation to operate as a jurisdictional
bar, courts have no authority to hear untimely petitions and cannot apply
equitable tolling.82 A statute of limitation, on the other hand, merely
defines the period within which parties must file claims.83 If the
legislature intends a time limit to act as a statute of limitation, courts
retain power to equitably toll the time period.' To determine whether the
legislature intended a time limit as a jurisdictional bar or a statute of
limitation, and ultimately whether the time limit can be equitably tolled,
courts must ascertain legislative intent by analyzing the relevant statute's
text, legislative history, structure, purpose, and overall policy
implications.85
1.

Time Periods Can Be Equitably Tolled Only If the Legislature
Intendeda Statute ofLimitation and Not a JurisdictionalBar

The U.S. Supreme Court and Washington courts have determined that
a jurisdictional time limit is not subject to equitable tolling; however, if a
time limit operates like a statute of limitation, it can be equitably tolled.86
For example, in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,87 the U.S. Supreme
Wash. App. 733, 739-40, 888 P.2d 161, 166-67 (1995); McMaster v. Farmer, 76 Wash. App. 464,
469-70, 886 P.2d 240, 242-43 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Freitag v. McGhie, 133
Wash. 2d 816, 947 P.2d 1186 (1997). But see infra note 229.
79. See infra Part II.B. 1.
80. In this Comment, "jurisdictional bar" is used interchangeably with "jurisdictional time limit,"
"jurisdictional limit," or "limitation on jurisdiction."
81. See Black's Law Dictionary 853 (6th ed. 1990); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); Duvall, 86 Wash. App. at 874, 940 P.2d at 673-74.
82. See, e.g., Duvall, 86 Wash. App. at 874, 940 P.2d at 673-74; see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393.
83. See Black's Law Dictionary927.
84. See, e.g., Duvall, 86 Wash. App. at 874, 940 P.2d at 674; see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393.
85. See infra Part II.B.2.
86. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
87. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).

Equitable Tolling

Court held that the filing deadline for administrative claims brought
before the EEOC may be equitably tolled.88 The Court stated that "filing
a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute
of limitations, is subject to... equitable tolling."89
While Zipes left open the question of whether time limits for suits
filed in a court of law can be subject to equitable tolling, 0 the Court
answered this question in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs.91 In
Irwin, the Court held that the thirty-day period for bringing an
employment discrimination case against the government could be
equitably tolled,92 but that the doctrine did not excuse the petitioner's
failure to file his claim timely.93 Irwin established a rebuttable
presumption that statutes of limitation are subject to equitable tolling.'
Washington courts similarly have found that statutes of limitation are
subject to equitable tolling but jurisdictional limits are not.95 For
example, in Douchette v. Bethel School DistrictNo. 403,96 the supreme
court held that the three-year statute of limitation for filing a civil action
under the Washington law against age discrimination97 was subject to
equitable tolling.9 After considering the Zipes holding and legislative

purposes for enacting age discrimination statutes, the Douchette court
found that the Washington statute contained an ordinary statute of
limitation and not a jurisdictional bar and therefore could be equitably
tolled in appropriate cases. 99 Likewise, in State v. Duvall," the court of
88. See id.at 393.

89. Id.
90. See id
91. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).

92. See id. at 94-96. The filing deadline at issue in Irwin stated that "[w]ithin thirty days ...an
employee... may file a civil action." Id, (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)).

93. See id. at 96 (finding lack of diligence when reason for late filing was attorney's absence from
office in which EEOC notice was properly received).

94. See id.at 95-96.
95. Of the eight Washington decisions addressing equitable tolling, four refer to this point
specifically. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text; cf.infra note 229. For the other four
cases, see infra note 139.
96. 117 Wash. 2d 805, 812P.2d 1362 (1991).
97. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1998).

98. See Douchette, 117 Wash. 2d at 811,818 P.2d at 1364.
99. See id (resting on Bonham v. DresserIndus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1977), decision
on federal age-discrimination statute, where Third Circuit stated that "the ADEA is remedial and
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appeals restated the principle that "[i]f the Legislature intended the [time]
period as a jurisdictional limit, then the court was without power to
determine restitution after [the period] expired ... ; if the Legislature
intended the ...period to operate as an ordinary
statute of limitations,
01
then the limit is subject to... equitable tolling."'
2.

AscertainingLegislative Intent by Statutory Construction

The U.S. Supreme Court and Washington courts have employed
statutory construction to determine whether a legislature intended a
statutory time limit to operate as a statute of limitation or a jurisdictional
bar. In particular, courts have looked to the statute's text, structure,
legislative history,
purpose, and policy considerations surrounding its
02
enactment. 1

In applying statutory construction in non-habeas circumstances, 3 the
U.S. Supreme Court has looked to the text, legislative history, and policy
considerations of various time limits." For example, in United States v.
Brockamp,"5 the Court analyzed these factors to hold that § 6511 of the6
0
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was not subject to equitable tolling.
Resting on Irwin, 7 the Court asked: "Is there good reason to believe that
Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?"' ' The
Court answered the question affirmatively, because § 6511 is set forth
"in unusually emphatic form," unlike the simple language in the Irwin

humanitarian legislation which should be liberally interpreted to effectuate the congressional
purpose of ending age discrimination in employment").
100. 86 Wash. App. 871, 940 P.2d 671 (1997).
101. Id. at 874, 940 P.2d at 673-74; see also Hazel v. Van Beek, 135 Wash. 2d 45, 61, 954 P.2d
1301, 1308 (1998); McMaster v. Farmer, 76 Wash. App. 464, 469, 886 P.2d 240, 242 (1994),
overruledon othergrounds by Freitag v. McGhie, 133 Wash. 2d 816,947 P.2d 1186 (1997).
102. See infra notes 105-38 and accompanying text.
103. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether the one-year deadline for filing a federal
habeas corpus petition is subject to equitable tolling. For federal circuit court decisions on this topic,
see infra note 153 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
105. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
106. See id. at 348. Brockamp involved two similar tax refund cases. In both cases, the taxpayer
filed an administrative claim for a tax refund after the statute of limitation ran. The taxpayers both
claimed that they could not make the deadline due to their respective disabilities and asked for an
equitable tolling of the time limit. See id.at 348-49.
107. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
108. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original).

Equitable Tolling
statute of limitation."° Moreover, the Court found that the text of the tax
statute expressly states that time-barred refunds "shall be considered

erroneous. 1. ° The Court also noted that § 6511 contains exceptions to its
time limits, but no exception includes equitable tolling."' In summary,
the Court stated that "[s]ection 6511's detail, its technical language, the
iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and

the explicit listing of exceptions, taken together, indicate... that
Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned,
open-ended,
1 12
'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote

The Brockamp Court also put forth a broader, policy-based justification for its holding that §6511 cannot be equitably tolled.' The Court
explained that tax law does not generally embrace particularized, casespecific exceptions based on equitable principles." 4 In support, the Court

cited to legislative history in which Congress deleted a provision
excusing tax deficiencies in the estates of insane or deceased persons due
to the difficulty of defining incompetence." 5 While the Brockamp Court
held that § 6511 was not subject to equitable tolling, it did restate the
16
general principle that most limitation periods can be equitably tolled."
Interpreting the Brockamp holding in the context of whether to toll

equitably the federal habeas corpus filing deadline, a federal district

109. Id. Section 6511, quoted in pertinent part by the Court, required that a
[c]laim for. :. refund.., of any tax... shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the
time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods
expires the later, or if no return was filed... within 2 years from the time the tax was
paid.... No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of
limitation prescribed... unless a claim for.., refund is filed... within such period... If the
claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period... the amount of the credit of refund
shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing
of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return .... If
the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not
exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the
claim.
Id. at 351 (citation omitted). For the text of the Irwin time limit, see supranote 92.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 351 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6514).
See id.
Id. at352.
Seei.
See id.
See id. (citing H.RLConf. Rep. No. 69-356, at 41 (1926)).

116. See id.at 350.
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court recently stated that in the absence of the factors mentioned in
Brockamp,
[i]t [would be] reasonable to assume that Congress intended that the
ordinary common law principles of equitable tolling would
apply.., so that the rigidity and arbitrariness inherent in any
statute of limitations would not go untempered by principles of
elementary fairness and the specifics of individual situations. The
lesson repeatedly learned over many centuries-that law must be
7
leavened with equity-cannot have been lost on Congress."
In United States v. Beggerly,"8 the Supreme Court, resting primarily
on the text of the statute, held that the doctrine of equitable tolling would
not apply in an action brought under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), which
provides a twelve-year limitation period." 9 In Beggerly, the plaintiffs
knew of the government's land claim for more than twelve years before
they brought suit challenging it. 2 ° The Court, citing Brockamp, stated
that "[e]quitable tolling is not permissible where it is inconsistent with
the text of the relevant statute."' 21 Because the QTA's twelve-year period
expressly begins to run when the plaintiff should have known of the
government's claim, the Court found that the statute, in effect, had
already allowed for equitable tolling. 22 Finally, the Court also
considered "the unusually generous nature" of the twelve-year limitation
period."' 3
Some Washington courts have followed the U.S. Supreme Court's
statutory construction model for determining whether the state legislature
intended a time limit to act as a statute of limitation or a jurisdictional
bar.'24 For example, in State v. Duvall,'25 an inmate objected to a

117. Vasquez v. Greiner, 68 F. Supp. 2d 307, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
118. 524 U.S. 38 (1998).
119. See id. at 49.
120. See id. at 48.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 48-49.
124. Of the eight Washington decisions discussing equitable tolling, four performed some form of
statutory construction analysis to determine the legislative intent behind the limitation period. See
infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text. For the other four cases, see infra note 139.
125. 84 Wash. App. 439, 928 P.2d 459 (1996), modified on reconsideration,86 Wash. App. 871,
940 P.2d 671 (1997).
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restitution order entered 257 days after sentencing.'26 The court ruled that
the sixty-day period for entering restitution under state law is not
jurisdictional but instead operates like an ordinary statute of limitation
and that tolling the period was warranted.'27 The court stated that the
language, history, and prior interpretation of the relevant statute
suggested that the state legislature did not intend the sixty-day period to
operate as an absolute jurisdictional bar.' The court noted that "[i]n the
same statute.., the Legislature also provided that the offender shall
remain under the court's jurisdiction for up to 10 years, and during that
time the court may modify the award."' 29 The court also considered the
general policy behind the restitution statute. 3 ° The court stated that the
general policy "is to require the offender 'to face the consequences of his
criminal conduct"' and found that this language shows legislative intent
to create judicial discretion over when to order restitution.'
Using a similar constructionist approach, the Washington court of
appeals in McMaster -v. Farmer' held that Washington's Uniform
Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) was not subject to equitable tolling.'
In making this determination, the court considered a provision in the text
that clearly states UFTA actions are "extinguished" unless brought
within the requisite time period. 34 After considering legislative
comments to UFTA, the court determined that the statute of limitation
bars the remedy sought and the right to seek a remedy.'35 Finally, the
court explained that the policy of the statute shows "a clear preference
for finality and uniformity over.., flexibility .... 13 6
Other Washington courts, while considering the plain language of a
statutory time limit, have also looked beyond the text of the statute to

126. See id at 441, 928 P.2d at 460.

127. See Id. at 444-45, 928 P.2d at 462.
128. See id.at 443, 928 P.2d at 461.
129. Id.

130. See id.
131. Id. (quoting State v. Davison, 116 Wash. 2d 917,922, 809 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1991)).
132. 76 Wash. App. 464, 886 P.2d 240 (1994), overnled on other grounds by Freitag v. McGhie,
133 Wash. 2d 816,947 P.2d 1186 (1997).
133. See id.at 469-70, 886 P.2d at 242-43 (interpreting Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.091).
134. See id.at 469, 886 P.2d at 242 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.091).
135. See id. (quoting Unif. Fraudulent Transfers Act § 9 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. 665-66).
136. Id. at 470, 886 P.2d at 243.
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ascertain legislative intent in determining whether to equitably toll a

limitation period. In determining whether to equitably toll the limitation
period governing a state discrimination claim, the state supreme court
considered the underlying policies and purposes of the statute.'3 7 In the
context of the limitation period governing statutory redemption of real
property, the court again looked to legislative purpose and stated that
"[i]n Washington equitable tolling is appropriate when consistent with
both the purpose of the statute providing the cause of action and the
purpose of the statute of limitations."' 38 Therefore, like federal courts,
when determining whether a limitation period should be subject to
equitable tolling, Washington courts attempt to ascertain legislative
intent through statutory construction.' 39
C.

Washington Courts Have Looked to Analogous FederalLaw for
PersuasiveAuthority in CollateralAttack and Equitable Tolling
Contexts

Washington courts have expressed a desire to look to federal law for
nonbinding guidance on state collateral attack and equitable tolling
issues. 4 ' In at least one case, In re Cook,'4 ' the state supreme court went
137. See Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash. 2d 805, 812-13, 818 P.2d 1362, 1365
(1991); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
138. Millay v. Cam, 135 Wash. 2d 193, 206, 955 P.2d 791, 797 (1998).
139. In four cases, Washington courts dismissed equitable tolling claims but did not rigorously
construe the statute to determine legislative intent. See Hazel v. Van Beek, 135 Wash. 2d 45, 61, 954
P.2d 1301, 1308 (1998); Gunnier v. Yakima Heart Ctr., Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 854, 864-65, 953 P.2d
1162, 1168 (1998); Prekeges v. King County, No. 41974-9-I, 1999 WL 675962, at *4 (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 30, 1999); Finkelstein v. Security Properties, Inc., 76 Wash. App. 733, 740, 888 P.2d 161,
167 (1995). Nevertheless, in each of these cases, the court assumed arguendo that the doctrine of
equitable tolling applies to the limitation period at issue and then dismissed the claim on the merits,
for example, by showing that the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in pursuing the claim. See,
e.g., Finkelstein, 76 Wash. App. at 740, 888 P.2d at 167 ("Assuming, without deciding, that
equitable tolling may be applied in this type of situation, it would not apply to the facts of this
case."). Thus, these cases do not actually address whether the limitation period is subject to equitable
tolling; these cases hold only that if equitable tolling applies, similarly situated plaintiffs would be
procedurally barred.
140. In other contexts, Washington courts have also been guided by federal law when the
Washington law is substantially analogous to federal law. See, e.g., Karst v. City of Seattle, No.
41504-2-1, 1999 WL 508299, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. July 19, 1999) (discrimination law) ("Because
our discrimination laws substantially parallel Title VII, we may look to federal law for nonbinding
guidance."); Somer v. RtY. Woodhouse, 28 Wash. App. 262, 272, 623 P.2d 1164, 1170 (1981) (state
agency procedure) ("Since no Washington authority adequately addresses the question ... we look
to federal law for guidance.").
141. 114 Wash. 2d 802, 792 P.2d 506 (1990).
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so far as to overrule existing state law, justifying the decision on, inter
alia, federal interpretation of analogous federal law. 42 The Cook court

replaced with federal precedent the then-current state precedent that
automatically barred a nonconstitutional argument in a state collateral
attack if the argument was not made during trial or on direct appeal. 43 In
support of its decision to adopt federal law, the court reasoned that "[i]n
other [collateral attack] cases,... interpretation of similar federal rules

[has] been looked to for guidance."'" In In re Haverty, 45 the Supreme
Court of Washington construed Washington Rules of Appellate

Procedure language in light of a federal decision interpreting an identical
phrase found in the "analogous" federal statute. 146 The supreme court has

also used federal age discrimination law in determining whether the
limitation period governing the Washington Law Against Discrimination

can be equitably tolled. 47 The court stated that "the federal cases provide
helpful analysis."' 14 While the supreme court disregarded arguments
based on federal habeas corpus jurisprudence in In re Runyan, 149 the

issue in the case concerned the constitutionality of the collateral attack
statute's one-year period, and "the federal suspension clause [of the U.S.

Constitution] does not serve the same purpose as our own state
suspension clause [in the Washington Constitution]."''

0

Thus, in the

contexts of state collateral attack and equitable tolling, when there is an
absence of state authority and federal law is substantially
similar,'
52
Washington courts have looked to federal law for guidance.

142. See id.
at 812,792 P.2d at 511.
143. Seei.
144. Id. at 812 n.3, 792 P.2d at 511 n.3 (citing In re Haverty, 101 Wash. 2d 498, 502-03, 681
P.2d 835, 838-89 (1984)).
145. 101 Wash. 2d 498,681 P.2d 835 (1984).
146. See ide
at 502-03, 681 P.2d at 838-39.
147. See Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wash. 2d 805, 811, 818 P.2d 1362, 136465 (1991).
148. Id.at 811, 818 P.2d at 1365.
149. 121 Wash. 2d 432,440-41,853 P.2d 424,429-30 (1993).
150. Id. at 441, 853 P.2d at 429. The "suspension clauses" refer to the U.S. and Washington
constitutional prohibitions against suspending the privilege of writs of habeas corpus. See U.S.
Const. art 1, § 9; Wash. Const. art. 1, § 13.
151. As discussed infra in Part IL.B, the Washington and federal time limits for collateral attacks
serve a virtually identical purpose.
152. Cf infra note 229.
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FederalCourts PermitEquitable Tollingfor Late Habeas Corpus
Petitions

While the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed equitable tolling of
the federal habeas corpus time limit, all federal circuit courts considering
the issue have held that the one-year filing period for federal habeas
corpus petitions should operate like a statute of limitation-not a
jurisdictional bar-and hence be subject to equitable tolling.'53 These
courts rest their decisions on Irwin, Brockamp, and Beggerly, and find
that the text, structure, legislative history, and purpose of the one-year
time bar compel equitable tolling in extraordinary situations. 1"4 The
circuit courts have found that the text of the statute is not jurisdictional in
nature, because Congress called the time limit a "period of limitations"
or "limitations period," and did not imply any limitation on
jurisdiction. 55 The Ninth Circuit has characterized the time limitation as
"neither detailed nor technical; it reads like an everyday, run-of-the-mill
statute of limitations."' 56 Courts also have concluded that the structure of
the statute supports a finding that the statute is not jurisdictional, as
Congress placed the time-limitation provision in a separate section from
the provision pertaining to district court jurisdiction.'5 7 Additionally,
courts have found that the legislative history supports the view that the
limitation period is similar to a statute of limitation, because there are no
references to jurisdictional limitations and members of Congress refer to

153. See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000); Miles
v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (1 Ith
Cir. 1999); Moore v. United States, 173 F.3d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1999); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d
806, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1998); Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 617-18
(3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Taliani v. Chrans, 189
F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir. 1999) (narrowing application of doctrine). The First Circuit has expressly left
the question open. See Libby v. Magnusson, 177 F.3d 43, 48 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999). The Second,
Fourth, and D.C. Circuits have not yet discussed the issue. However, district courts in the Second
Circuit apply the doctrine based on the reasoning of other circuits. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Greiner, 68
F. Supp. 2d 307, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Torres v. Miller, No. 99 Civ. 0580 MBM, 1999 WL 714349,
at *5 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1999).
154. See cases cited supranote 153.
155. See, e.g., Sandvik, 177 F.3d at 1271; Davis, 158 F.3d at 811; Miller, 145 F.3d at 618;
Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997).
156. Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288 n.4.
157. See, e.g., Sandvik, 177 F.3d at 1271; Davis, 158 F.3d at 811; Miller, 145 F.3d at 618; see
also Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1289 ("[T]he Act's... structure-points in the same direction: [the
statute's] one-year timing provision is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling, not a
jurisdictional bar.").

Equitable Tolling

the period as a statute of limitation.'

While the purpose of the federal

one-year limit is "to curb the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus," the
Third Circuit found that this purpose is consistent with finding that the

time limit is a statute of limitation subject to equitable tolling, because
equitable tolling is a discretionary doctrine applied only in extraordinary
circumstances.' 9 Finally, courts have bulwarked their decisions to
equitably toll the limitation period upon finding more unyielding statutes

already subject to equitable tolling. 16

III. THE WASHINGTON COLLATERAL ATTACK FILING
DEADLINE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUITABLE TOLLING
RCW 10.73.090, which governs the one-year collateral attack
deadline, should be subject to equitable tolling for two reasons. First, the
statute's text, legislative history, structure, purpose, and policy

implications indicate that the time limit is a statute of limitation, not a
jurisdictional bar, and thus can be equitably tolled.16' Second, the state
and federal collateral attack filing deadlines are analogous statutes;' 62

because Washington law is virtually silent on whether RCW 10.73.090 is
subject to equitable tolling, state courts should follow the reasoning of
the wealth of federal authority holding that the federal time limit can be

equitably tolled.16

158. See, eg., Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (stating that "congressional conference report does not refer
to jurisdiction, and statements by various members of Congress refer to the period as a statute of
limitations") (citations omitted); Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288 (stating that legislative history "speaks
with equally resounding clarity. Neither the conference report, nor any statements of individual
House or Senate members, describe the one-year limitation as a restriction on federal court
jurisdiction.") (citations omitted); see also Sandvik, 177 F.3d at 1271 ("Section 2255's limit shares a
legislative history with § 2244... that makes clear that both statutes were intended to be ordinary
statutes of limitation and not jurisdictional bars.") (footnote omitted).
159. Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (citation omitted) (finding that time limit serves this purpose,
because "[i]t provides a one-year limitation period that will considerably speed up the habeas
process while retaining judicial discretion to equitably toll in extraordinary circumstances").
160. See, e.g., Davis, 158 F.3d at 811; Calderon, 128 F.3d at 1288.
161. See infra Part lIA.
162. See infra Part M.B.
163. See infra Part IILB.
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Statutory ConstructionIllustratesThat the LegislatureIntended
RCW 10. 73.090 as a Statute ofLimitation

To determine whether RCW 10.73.090 is subject to the doctrine of
equitable tolling, Washington courts should apply statutory construction
to ascertain whether the legislature intended a statute of limitation or a
jurisdictional bar. Modem equitable tolling jurisprudence, as applied by
federal and Washington courts, prescribes this analysis." 6 Moreover, a
comprehensive statutory construction analysis is the best way to
determine legislative intent.'6 5
Although Washington law is unclear as to whether RCW 10.73.090
can be equitably tolled, after applying statutory construction, courts
should find that the one-year time limit operates like a statute of
limitation, not a jurisdictional bar, and hence should be subject to
equitable tolling." 6 Subjecting RCW 10.73.090 to equitable tolling
would not impede the time limit's purpose of controlling the flow and
promptness of collateral attacks. 67
1.

The Text ofRCW 10. 73.090 Shows Legislative Intent to Enact a
Statute ofLimitation

The text of RCW 10.73.090 evidences legislative intent to create a
statute of limitation and not a jurisdictional bar.'68 First, the title of the
section is "Collateral Attack-One year time limit," and the text refers to
the limit in terms of the petitioner's filing deadline;'69 the statute does not
imply any cutoff of the reviewing court's jurisdiction. For example, the
statute plainly states that "[n]o petition ... may be filed more than one
year after the judgment becomes final .
,,..71When explaining
exceptions to the time limit, the legislature states that in certain
circumstances "[t]he time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090 does not
apply to apetition .... ." The legislature's express reference to the time
164.
165.
(1999).
166.
167.
168.

See supraPart H.B.
See Union Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. State, 96 Wash. App. 288, 294, 980 P.2d 779, 782

See infra Part III.A.1-3; cf infra note 229.
See infra Part III.A.4.
For the relevant text of RCW 10.73.090, see supra text accompanying note 39.
169. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (1998).
170. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(1) (emphasis added).
171. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100 (1998) (emphasis added).
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limit's application to the filing of the petition illustrates that the time
limit does not apply to a court's jurisdiction, authority, or power to hear
the case.172 Even assuming that the object of the one-year time limit is
ambiguous, the rule of lenity" requires that textual ambiguities be
resolved in favor of the petitioner. 7 4 In an equitable tolling context, this
rule would mean that the deadline does not refer to a jurisdictional limit.
Second, unlike the "detailed and technical" tax statute in Brockamp,75
which the Court determined was not subject to equitable tolling,'7 6 the
one-year deadline in RCW 10.73.090 is more akin to the simple time
limit in Irwin, which was subject to equitable tolling. 177 Like the Irwin
statute, RCW 10.73.090 is a straightforward, bright-line statute providing
7
the general rule that petitioners have one year to file collateral attacks.' 1
The statute in Brockamp, on the other hand, involved a multitude of
differing periods with varying ramifications, all predicated on the diverse
factual status of claimants. 179 Unlike the Brockamp tax statute, RCW
10.73.090 applies to all inmates filing collateral attacks, unless their
claims fall under a RCW 10.73.100 exception in which case no deadline
applies.8 While RCW 10.73.100 does not reference equitable tolling,
express exceptions provide only one set of considerations in determining

172. Cf Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash. 2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327,

1331 (1986) ("A court may not read into a statute those things which it conceives the Legislature
may have left out unintentionally."); King County v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 988, 991,425 P.2d

887, 889 (1967) (stating that courts are not to read into statutes matters that are not there).
173. The rule of lenity is a judicial doctrine requiring courts to construe ambiguous criminal
statutes in favor of the accused. See In re Hopkins, 137 Wash. 2d 897, 901, 976 P.2d 616, 617-18

(1999).
174. See In re Well, 133 Wash. 2d 433, 447, 946 P.2d 750, 756 (1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting)
(applying rule of lenity to interpret RCW 10.73.090).
175. See supranote 109 and accompanying text.
176. See supranote 106 and accompanying text.
177. See supranote 92 and accompanying text.
178. See supraPart LB.

179. See supranote 109 and accompanying text.
180. See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
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whether a statute can be equitably 8tolled.''
RCW 10.73.100 also does
2
not purport to be an exhaustive list.
Finally, other textual indicators show that RCW 10.73.090 was meant
to operate as a statute of limitation and not a jurisdictional bar. Unlike
the statute in Beggerly,'83 equitable tolling accords with the text of RCW
10.73.090, as none of its provisions or exceptions suggest that the
legislature intended to build in equitable considerations, rendering
equitable tolling superfluous. Moreover, RCW 10.73.090 does not
contain any provision that "extinguishes" claims, like the UFTA
limitation period in McMaster."s Lastly, but quite significantly,
Washington courts routinely call the one-year time limit a "procedural
bar"' 5 and a "statute of limitation,"'8 6 and have never characterized the
statute as a limit on their authority.'87 Thus, an examination of the text of
RCW 10.73.090 illustrates that the legislature intended the one-year time
limit to operate as a statute of limitation, not a jurisdictional bar.
2.

The Structure ofRCW 10. 73.090 IllustratesLegislative Intent to
Enact a Statute ofLimitation

The structure of the Washington collateral attack statute also
demonstrates legislative intent that the one-year deadline provide a
181. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 351 (1997); see also Carlisle v. United States,
517 U.S. 416, 435 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (implying that even in face of putative,
exclusionless limitation periods, equitable tolling may apply).
182. RCW 10.73.100 states only that the one-year deadline "does not apply" in the six named
situations. Plainly speaking, this does not mean that the deadline "does not apply" in unnamed
situations as well. The fact that the legislature enacted RCW 10.73.100 in this manner arguably
shows it surmised other exceptions could apply. See also cases cited supranote 172.
183. See supranotes 118-23 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., In re Well, 133 Wash. 2d 433, 443, 946 P.2d 750, 754 (1997) (stating that when
petition is untimely pursuant to RCW 10.73.090-.100, "the petition is procedurally barred").
186. See, e.g., Shumway v. Payne, 136 Wash. 2d 383, 397-98, 964 P.2d 349, 356 (1998) ("RCW
10.73.090 subjects collateral attacks... to a one-year statute of limitation.... The statute of
limitation [is]... in RCW 10.73.090(1)."); id. at 397-99, 964 P.2d at 356 (calling time period a
"statute of limitation" numerous times); In re Runyan, 121 Wash. 2d 432, 445, 853 P.2d 424, 432
(1993) ("[Tlhis statute of limitations on petitions for collateral review is constitutional."); State v.
Otto, No. 16996-1-1I, 1999 WL 1028782, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1999) ("The one-year
time limit of RCW 10.73.090 is a statute of limitation for any collateral attack."); see also In re
Pirtle, 136 Wash. 2d 467,471 n.1, 965 P.2d 593, 598 n.1 (1998); In re Benn, 134 Wash. 2d 868, 884
n.3, 939-40, 952 P.2d 116, 125 n.3, 152 (1998); In re Becker, 96 Wash. App. 902, 903, 982 P.2d
639, 639 (1999); State v. Burton, 92 Wash. App. 114, 118, 960 P.2d 480,482 (1998).
187. See also infra note 229.

Equitable Tolling
statute of limitation rather than a jurisdictional bar. The source of court
jurisdiction over collateral attack proceedings is found not in RCW
10.73.090, but in Washington Rule of Appellate Procedure 16.3(c) and
Article 4, section 4, of the Washington Constitution.' The express laws
governing jurisdiction and filing deadlines are structurally distinct. The
legislature is presumed to know applicable rules of appellate procedure
when promulgating legislation pertaining to the right to appeal a criminal
judgment.8 9 Had the legislature intended to enact a jurisdictional bar, it
should have clearly stated so, at least by referring to appellate rule
16.3(c). However, due to the clear structural distinction between the
source of jurisdiction over postconviction proceedings and the source of
the one-year limit governing the timeliness of petitions, RCW 10.73.090
implies no restriction on jurisdiction.re
3.

The Legislative History of RCW 10. 73.090 Implies Legislative
Intent to Enact a Statute ofLimitation

Legislative history supports the conclusion that the collateral attack
statute was meant as a statute of limitation and not a limitation on
jurisdiction.' 9' RCW 10.73.090 was passed as Laws of 1989, chapter
395, section 1.92 In section 3 of the same chapter, the legislature
amended RCW 7.36.130, which restricts court jurisdiction to hear
untimely requests to review custody orders."9 In section 3, the legislature
stated that "[nlo court... shall inquire into the legality of any judgment
or process whereby the party is in custody."' 94 If the legislature intended
section 1 to be a jurisdictional bar, it would have used language similar

188. But see Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.040 (1998) (implementing Washington Constitution Article

4, section 4, grant of state habeas corpus jurisdiction); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.140 (1998)
(limiting judicial consideration of successive petitions).
189. See State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. App. 364,367,967 P.2d 1282, 1283 (1998).
190. A similar structural argument is made regarding the equitable tolling of the federal statute.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 35.
193. See Criminal Judgments and Sentences-Collateral Attacks-One Year Time Limit, ch.
395, § 3, 1989 Wash. Laws 2149,2150.
194. Criminal Judgments and Sentences-Collateral Attacks-One Year Time Limit, ch. 395,
§ 3, 1989 Wash. Laws 2149,2150.
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to that of section 3.195 Furthermore, the House Journal, Senate Journal,
Legislative Digest, and Final Bill Reports contain no references to, or
even implications of, a jurisdictional limitation on hearing collateral
attacks. 19 6 Like the text of the statute, the Final Legislative Report
implies that the object of the time limit is not court jurisdiction but the
filing of the petition, like a statute of limitation.'97
4.

The Policy Implications andLegislative Purpose ofRCW 10.73.090
Are Consistent with Equitable Tolling

The legislative policies and purposes behind the enactment of the
collateral attack filing deadline accord with equitable tolling.19
Washington courts have explained that the legislature enacted RCW
10.73.090 to "encourage[] prompt collateral attacks and control[] the
flow of post-conviction collateral relief petitions."' ' "This is important
because collateral relief undermines finality and sometimes costs society
the right to punish admitted offenders. ''2
"" Subjecting RCW 10.73.090 to
equitable tolling would allow courts to hear cases where extraordinary
circumstances prevented petitioners from filing collateral attack petitions
in a timely fashion."' In the vast majority of cases-that is, the ordinary
cases-equitable tolling would not apply. In these ordinary cases, the
goals of finality and streamlining the collateral attack process would still
be achieved.20 2
While ruling on equitable tolling claims would require judicial
resources, it would not place an undue burden on the courts or the
state. 0 3 Under the current system, inmates can file as many collateral
attacks as they wish, even after one year, and courts must at least process
195. This argument, while similar to the structural argument in Part III.A.2, rests on the basic
canon of construction that when a legislature uses different language, it intends different meanings.
See Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wash. 2d 305, 313, 884 P.2d
920, 924-25 (1994).
196. See legislative materials cited supra note 44.
197. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
199. In re Becker, 96 Wash. App. 902, 905, 982 P.2d 639, 640 (1999) (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 640-41 (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (citing Shumway v. Payne, 136
Wash. 2d 383, 399, 964 P.2d 349, 357 (1998)).
201. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 159; see also Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th
Cir. 1997).
203. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.

Equitable Tolling
them.2" For courts to consider a successive collateral attack on the
merits, however, petitioners must raise new grounds and show good
cause why these grounds were not raised in a previous petition. 5
Moreover, courts can dismiss frivolous petitions without requiring the
state to respond." 6 Courts in most cases would easily be able to dismiss
equitable tolling claims on the merits by showing a lack of due diligence
or extraordinary circumstances." 7 Finally, because the requirements for
equitable tolling are rigorous, abuse of the doctrine would be highly
unlikely, and the incentive would remain for inmates to file within the
one-year deadline. Equitable tolling in extraordinary cases is therefore
not inconsistent with the general policy of encouraging prompt filings of
collateral attacks.
5.

Conclusion:Statutory ConstructionShows That RCW 10.73.090
Can Be Equitably Tolled

Federal and state precedent dictate that courts may apply equitable
tolling to a limitation period only if the legislature intended a statute of
limitation and not a jurisdictional bar.2 a8 Equitable tolling jurisprudence
requires a statutory construction analysis to determine legislative
intent.209 After analyzing the text, structure, legislative history, policy
implications, and purpose of Washington's one-year time limit for
bringing collateral attacks, courts should find that this one-year limit
operates °like a statute of limitation and is thus subject to equitable
21
tolling.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.140 (1998).
See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.140.
See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100 (1998).
See, e.g., supranote 72 and accompanying text.
See supraPart ILB.1.
See supraPart I.B.2.
See supra PartIHLA.1-4.
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FederalHabeas Corpus JurisprudenceShould Persuade
Washington Courts to Apply the Doctrineof Equitable Tolling to
RCW 10. 73.090

After considering the limitations law of federal habeas corpus,
Washington courts should find that RCW 10.73.090 can be equitably
tolled.2 ' In history, content, and purpose, federal collateral attack law in
the limitation context is analogous to Washington collateral attack law
and thus should be considered highly persuasive and instructive." 2 Prior
to the enactment of the state and federal one-year time limits, neither
jurisdiction contained any filing deadline. 1 3 Not only do Washington and
federal laws share a general one-year filing deadline, they also share
similar exceptions."1 4 For example, federal law provides an exception for
a change in law,2" 5 as does Washington law;2" 6 federal law also provides
an exception based on newly discovered evidence," 7 similar to
218
Washington law.
Unlike the difference in purpose between the state and federal
suspension clauses noted in Runyan,2 9 a difference that convinced the
Runyan court not to consider federal law,220 the purposes for enacting
filing deadlines for Washington and federal collateral attacks are
substantially similar. The Washington state legislature enacted its time
limit to "encourage[] prompt collateral attacks and control[] the flow of
post-conviction collateral relief petitions,"'" and Congress enacted the
federal time limit to "speed up the habeas process"' and "curb abuse of

211. Washington courts look to analogous federal law when the state law lacks precedent, see
supraPart II.C, and federal courts permit equitable tolling. See supraPart II.D.
212. See infra notes 213-23 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 34 and 54.
214. See supra notes 39-40, 55-59, and accompanying text.
215. See supra text accompanying note 58.
216. See supra text accompanying note 40.
217. See supra text accompanying note 59.
218. See supra text accompanying note 40.
219. See supra text accompanying note 150.
220. See supra text accompanying note 150.
221. In re Becker, 96 Wash. App. 902, 905, 982 P.2d 639, 640 (1999) (citations omitted).
222. Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999); Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of
Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998).
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the writ of habeas corpus." m Thus, the history, content, and purpose of
the Washington law and its federal counterpart are analogous.
Washington courts look to analogous federal law for guidance when
federal courts have addressed an issue on which state law is silentY24
While Washington law is virtually silent on whether RCW 10.73.090
should be subject to equitable tolling,'m a wealth of federal authority
supports equitable tolling of the analogous federal law. 6 Moreover, the
reasoning federal courts use to justify equitable tolling of the federal
statute is reasoning that when independently applied to RCW 10.73.090
also supports equitable tolling. 7 Therefore, Washington courts should
likewise find that the one-year time bar for bringing a collateral attack on
a criminal judgment may be equitably tolled.
IV. CONCLUSION
Equitably tolling Washington's collateral attack filing deadline in
extraordinary circumstances strikes a favorable balance between
finalizing criminal judgments and avoiding unjust incarcerations. The
legislature enacted RCW 10.73.090 to streamline the collateral attack
process. By its very terms, the one-year time limit achieves this goal by
encouraging rapid filing; courts can simply dismiss late petitions as
procedurally defective. Nevertheless, this desire for finality should not be
interpreted too broadly-especially in light of the astonishingly high rate
of wrongful convictions."m
By applying a statutory construction analysis and considering federal
habeas corpus jurisprudence, Washington courts should find that RCW
10.73.090 is a statute of limitation subject to equitable tolling.229 Use of
223. Fisher, 174 F.3d at 713 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944); Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (same).
224. See supra Part lC.
225. Butsee infra note 229.
226. See supra Part IlD.
227. See supra Part IliA.
228. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
229. After certification for publication of this Comment, but before actual publication, Division
Three of the Washington Court of Appeals found that RCW 10.73.090 is subject to equitable tolling.
See In re Hoisington, No. 18621-1-R, 2000 WL 197890, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2000). The
court then tolled the time limit, as previous courts neglected to rule on the petitioner's properly
raised issue in prior timely appeals. See id. Although the court reached the correct conclusion, its
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the equitable tolling doctrine would not frustrate the purpose of the
statute, for equitable tolling applies only in extraordinary cases,
mitigating the harsh consequences of rigid adherence to the one-year
deadline. More importantly, without the possibility of equitable tolling,
our state criminal justice system would most certainly fail that small
number of possibly innocent inmates who, because of forces out of their
control, could not file their petitions on time. While these cases may
occur only at the margins, the mere fact that they exist begs for a judicial
safeguard.

reasoning remained wanting. The court considered only (1) that RCW 10.73.090 does not expressly
contain the word "jurisdiction," and (2) that the legislature separated RCW 10.73.090 from RCW
10.73.140, which limits consideration of successive collateral attacks. See id. at *4. The court
misplaced factor (2), because the argument should relate to the source of judicial jurisdiction, not
merely a restriction to hear successive petitions. See supra Part II.A.2. While courts should find
factor (1) relevant, it is not conclusive alone. The Asotin County Prosecuting Attorney's Office will
be appealing this ruling to the Supreme Court of Washington. See Telephone Interview with Ray D.
Lutes, Asotin County Prosecutor (Feb. 23, 2000).

